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It has long been the tradition of American citizens to pray for divine blessing and guidance in their civic business. This tradition, which predates 
the founding of the American Republic, finds ex-
pression at all levels of government, federal, state, 
and local. It was embraced by the First Continental 
Congress, the same congress that both employed a 
paid chaplain and later drafted the First Amendment 
to the U.S. Constitution; it was maintained during 
the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment; and it 
persists in various guises to this day.
By and large, the language of American civic 
benedictions—monotheist, biblically inf lected, 
vaguely Protestant—reflects the country’s Chris-
tian history and the religious convictions of a large, 
albeit diminishing, segment of its population. The 
ritual generally consists of a prayer or petition for 
the blessings of God—or the Almighty, or Provi-
dence, or the Heavenly Father—in discharging 
the deliberative functions of government. Sometimes the 
prayers are distinctly Christian, invoking Jesus Christ; at 
other times they are vaguely Christian; and sometimes they 
are not Christian at all. These petitions, which commonly 
include acknowledgments of fallibility accompanied by sup-
plications for the wisdom to do justice and the protection 
of the citizenry, have been assigned the label “legislative 
prayer.” But the civic invocation of divine benediction is 
a much broader American phenomenon, encompassing 
Thanksgiving proclamations, presidential addresses, reli-
gious displays on government land, national days of prayer 
and fasting, and so on.
Legislative prayer is the subject of the latest religion-
clause challenge to reach the U.S. Supreme Court: Town 
of Greece v. Galloway, a case brought by two plaintiffs, one 
atheist and one Jewish, who claim that the legislative prayer 
practices of a small enclave in upstate New York are uncon-
stitutional. The prayers selected by the municipality have 
been nearly uniformly Christian, and a lower court judged 
both the town’s selection practices and the content of the 
prayers too consistently Christian to pass muster under the 
Establishment Clause, which proscribes laws “respecting 
an establishment of religion.”
Evaluated by the conventional materials of constitutional 
adjudication—constitutional text, historical practice, and 
legal precedent—Town of Greece might seem a relatively 
easy case. Going back to the first Congress that drafted the 
Establishment Clause, the practices comprising legislative 
prayer were never thought to constitute laws respecting an 
establishment of religion. Thirty years ago, in Marsh v. 
Chambers, the Court ruled that the legislative prayer practice 
of Nebraska’s state legislature—in which for sixteen years 
a publicly funded Presbyterian chaplain delivered prayers 
containing, as Justice William Brennan put it, “Christological 
references”—was constitutional in light of the “unambiguous 
and unbroken history” of the tradition of legislative prayer 
dating from our nation’s founding. Marsh held that as long 
as the government is not “proselytizing” or “advancing” 
religion—that is, attempting to convert citizens or putting 
its coercive authority behind a particular faith—legislative 
prayer is constitutionally permissible.
Resolution of the case has been complicated, however, by 
a well-meaning but errant doctrinal byway that the Court 
has fitfully pursued since the mid-1980s. In response to 
complaints about the display of religious symbols on govern-
ment property, several justices began to inquire whether the 
government had “endorsed” religion in such a way as to cause 
political offense or estrangement. Yet, since the government 
makes something of a habit of saying offensive things, the 
Court needed a limiting principle—and so it decided to 
consider only the ostracized sentiments of a hypothetical 
“reasonable observer.” That approach—in which the Court 
purports to distinguish between reasonable and unreasonable 
offense—has generated considerable consternation, a point 
Justice Elena Kagan acknowledged at oral argument. The 
lower court in the case seemingly extended the endorsement 
test to the issue of legislative prayer, but it does not appear 
likely that the Supreme Court will follow suit. Instead, 
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oral argument zeroed in on other possible standards—the 
distinction between “sectarian” and “nonsectarian” prayer, 
for instance, or the question of legal coercion.
The best argument for the unconstitutionality of this 
particular legislative prayer practice concerns the issue of 
coercion. The plaintiffs’ lawyer, Douglas Laycock, argued ef-
fectively that the Greece town council—unlike the Nebraska 
legislature in Marsh—is not a purely legislative body, since it 
exercises various administrative and other functions. Citizens 
who appear before it are seeking specific outcomes—zoning 
variances, changes in school policies, and the like—and may 
be placed in the awkward position of showing the prayer 
practice an unwanted respect, or perhaps even of participat-
ing in it, in order not to prejudice their claims before the 
council. A core function of the Establishment Clause is to 
prohibit government from imposing religious doctrine on 
the unwilling. Citizens should not be coerced by the state 
to act in ways they find religiously objectionable.
Yet this argument faces several obstacles. First, though in 
Lee v. Weisman (1992) the Court recognized psychological 
coercion as constitutionally problematic in the context of a 
middle-school graduation prayer, it would need to extend the 
concept considerably. Adult citizens with business before the 
town council, unlike middle-schoolers, are not required to 
attend the legislative prayer, which, moreover, occurs some 
time before the council considers the matters before it. Sec-
ond, if the Court were to extend the psychological-coercion 
approach to this context, it is difficult to see why various 
court practices—in which attendees are instructed to rise 
as a marshal announces, “God save the United States and 
this honorable Court”—are not similarly coercive to those 
with business before the court. Third, hybrid governmental 
bodies are quite common, and a standard that required judges 
to discern between purely legislative and quasi-legislative 
bodies would be difficult to administer and might appear 
arbitrary. Finally, local legislative bodies have been seeking 
divine benediction for centuries. For all these reasons the 
nonfunded, volunteer prayers in Greece, New York, seem 
to fall within Marsh ’s general rule.
The likelihood that the Court will reaffirm Marsh whole-
sale is uncertain, however, in part because the Court—and 
Justice Anthony Kennedy in particular—seemed frustrated 
by Marsh’s historical approach. How, Kennedy inquired, can 
the mere existence of a tradition be its own justification? 
What if the tradition turns out to have been a “historical 
aberration,” one lacking a “rational explanation”? Whatever 
its status as a moral justification, pastness alone may well 
be a constitutional justification. Evidence of past practice 
and understanding is relevant to the meaning of the Estab-
lishment Clause and legislative prayer’s consistency with it. 
Furthermore, characterizing the justification for the tradition 
of legislative prayer as a historical accident, or as a brute as-
sertion that “we’ve always done it this way,” implies that the 
many generations of Americans who engaged in the practice 
for centuries had no reason at all to do so—or that their 
reason must have been the impermissible one of declaring 
the superiority of Christianity above all other religions.
In fact they had other reasons. Civic benediction is an acknowledgement of the limits of government and of its perpetual capacity to do wrong. To seek divine guid-
ance and protection in the civic context is to recognize 
that government is imperfect and fragile, and that human 
power—even when exercised thoughtfully and with benefi-
cent intentions— can fail to do justice. At one point in the 
oral argument, Justice Kagan rightly observed that “when 
we relate to our government, we all do so as Americans,” 
not as religious or non-religious individuals. That is true, 
and legislative prayer is part of that American heritage. It 
is a mechanism for citizens to acknowledge these limita-
tions—personal and systemic—before they make law and 
set policy.
Admittedly, these are not beliefs everyone shares; athe-
ists no less than religious persons may be confident that 
the government can provide, and ought to provide, perfect 
justice. But they are beliefs that lie embedded in Ameri-
can constitutional governance. When the Preamble of the 
Constitution sets out the People’s aspiration to form a “more 
perfect Union,” that is a tacit civic aff irmation that the 
Constitution is not perfect now and can never be made so. 
As the work of human hands, it is inherently imperfect, 
for if it were perfect, neither it nor the Union itself would 
ever change. But they do change, by the illumination of re-
sources outside themselves. A primary function of legislative 
prayer has always been to express humility about govern-
ment’s powers—uncertainty about its judgments—and to 
affirm the separation of the realm of politics and law from 
whatever realms lie beyond it. The reasons for exploring 
the long, unbroken historical tradition of legislative prayer 
recognized in Marsh relate not to the might of religion, but 
to the tragic weakness of government. Legislative prayer 
thus reflects an understanding of the separation of church 
and state—an acknowledgment of distinct jurisdictions of 
authority and truth. And this is the sense in which history 
can be a guide to the future.
It may be that Americans today no longer perceive legisla-
tive prayer in these terms—perhaps due to increased religious 
pluralism, or to the attenuation of compatriotism and civic 
fellowship, or to the growing sense that government is in-
deed the sole available source of justice and ought to achieve 
nothing less than perfect law. And so we should be cautious 
about the uses of legislative prayer, and ready to question its 
political wisdom. But recognizing the independent spheres of 
government and of what lies outside it reflects an ancient yet 
supple reason—one rooted in American legal tradition—for 
upholding the constitutionality of this practice. n
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